Book Reviews by Editors,
BOOK REVIEWS
CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT. By Charles Warren.
Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1925, pp. xii, 308.
In view of the many discussions of the relation of the judicial power to
unconstitutional legislation, it might have been doubted whether another volume
on this subject would be worth while; but this doubt is completely dispelled by
this book, and the many persons who have read with pleasure and profit Mr.
Warren's "The Supreme Court in United States History" will find a similar
satisfaction in this new volume.
It presents a discussion of the justification for the Courts authority to deal
with unconstitutional legislation, not only from the viewpoint of history and of
constitutional theory, but also with reference to the manner in which the Court
has exerted this power in the decision of cases. The historical considerations
adduced in support of the power amount almost to a demonstration and consti-
tute, it is believed, easily the best available presentation of this phase of the
question. The natural development of the theory from colonial ideas is traced,
and special confirmation of the belief that the Court was intended to exercise
such power is shown to exist in the attitude of the early Congresses. Among
other things the author points out that even in the very first Congress recog-
nition of the power is implicit in Section 25 of that most important act, the
Judiciary Act of 1789; and the correctness of his conclusion is emphasized by
the fact that it was not until the bitter partisan discussions over the Alien and
Sedition Laws and the Circuit Court Act of i8or, and the decline of the Fed-
eralist party, made the question of the Court's power a practical political issue
that any real attack upon its existence developed.
Mr. Warren points out, as Mr. Justice Holmes has done,
1 that an important
distinction exists between the action of the Court with respect to Congressional
legislation and its action with respect to State legislation, a distinction often
overlooked in popular discussions of the Courts power. The tendency to over-
look or ignore this distinction leads to confusion of thought and unfounded
criticism. In the latter part of the book is included a careful discussion of the
cases in which the Supreme Court has held acts of Congress unconstitutional;
and, as will readily appear from a study of the cases, the instances of importance
in which the power has been exercised adversely to Congressional legislation
are relatively few, and by this pragmatic test the justification for the Court's
authority is definitely strengthened.
On the other hand, it is a matter of some regret that the discussion of cases
in which the Supreme Court has held unconstitutional State legislation is rela-
tively limited; and while it seems clear that many of the arguments against the
Court's power in its relation to Congressional legislation are inapplicable to State
statutes, and while our dual system of government seems to require that some
Federal authority should be in a position to pass on the validity of State statutes,
'Collected Legal Papers, pp. 295-29
6 :
"I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our
power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think that the Union would
be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the
several States."
(5y7)
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it is believed that there is room here for further discussion, and it is to be
hoped that the present author will not overlook the opportunity.
There is included in the volume a discussion of the proposals to require
more than a majority of the Court in order to invalidate legislation, and the
further proposal to permit Congress, under certain circumstances, to re-pass
legislation even in the face of an adverse decision of the Court; and the inherent
weakness of these proposals, including their inapplicability to State laws, is
carefully analyzed. In addition, the lack of candor frequently found in argu-
ments against the power of the Court, and in support of modifications thereof,
is indicated with definiteness.
Not the least interesting part of the book is the chapter dealing with "Labor
and the Supreme Court," wherein the cases affecting labor are carefully and
candidly discussed. The author concedes the weakness of the decisions in the
Lochner', Adair' and Coppage cases, but points out that, even so, the basis for
criticism is limited, and, in part, has nothing to do with the matter of the consti-
tutional validity of legislation.
To the reviewer, strongly imbued as he is with the importance of the Court's
power and its essential place in the American system, there is one problem that
presents difficulties of no little seriousness and upon which further discussion
might be desired. The point is this: many of the principles by which the
Supreme Court undertakes to determine the validity or the invalidity of legisla-
tion are not only indefinite, but involve considerations so closely resembling
political considerations that some decisions seem to turn more on questions of
policy than on questions of law, and it is obvious that decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States are not expected to constitute expressions on the
part of its members of their views with respect to matters of policy. But
in the New York Bakeshop Case', the Court condemned the New York statute
largely on the theory that a law limiting the hours that persons might work in
bakeries had no real or substantial relation to the promotion of public health.
In the first decision of the Legal Tender Casese , the Court held the act uncon-
stitutional because, in its opinion, the addition of the quality of legal tender to
bills of credit did not constitute a means appropriate to the carrying on of the
Civil War. In determining whether State laws affecting interstate commerce
do or do not constitute direct burdens thereon, the Supreme Court invokes the
principle that the State may not regulate interstate commerce in a matter of
national concern, that a matter of national concern is one that requires, for its
proper regulation, a uniform system. How is the Court to know that interstate
commerce requires, for its appropriate regulation, a uniform system rather than
a diversified system? This question closely resembles the character of question
which is supposed to be debated in the legislative hall. Under the Due Process
clause, the principle seems to be whether the law is arbitrary; and this is
frequently tested by the question whether, while ostensibly passed to accomplish
-'Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (igo5).
'Adair v. U. S., 2o8 U. S. 161 (19o8).
'Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. I (1915).
'Lochner v. New York, supra n. 2.
'Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 6o3 (187o).
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a certain public purpose, the Court, in spite of the view of the legislature, can
say that it has no real or substantial relation to that purpose.
A mere recital of these illustrations of principles announced and applied by
the Court indicates the narrowness of the line which divides the judicial power
from the political power in this class of cases; and naturally invites discussion
of the principles which determine when a political question begins to take on a
judicial complexion.
The quality of the work done by Mr. Warren, both in this volume and in his
others, engenders the hope that he will continue his study of the Supreme Court,
a subject always fascinating to the lawyer, and made doubly so by this author
because of the ease and clarity of his style which, with its excellent English,
renders his books almost as interesting to the layman as they are sure to be to
the lawyer.
Henry Wolf Bikli.
University of Pennsylvania.
FEDEmAL INCOME TAx. By George E. Holmes. 6th Ed. Indianapolis, Bobs,
Merrill Co., 1925, pp. 1592.
It is essential that the practicing attorney of today have some knowledge
of the income tax and how it is computed, assessed and collected by the Federal
Government, with its bearing on transactions which arise daily, such as the sale
of property, reorganization of corporations, etc. Not only must he be familiar
with the latest Revenue Act (x924) which affects most of the present day
transactions, but he is frequently called upon to give advice concerning prio"
acts in so far as they affect past transactions, since most of the tax quetos
that are being litigated at the present time arise not under the xg2 Act but
under the 1916, igi and 1921 Acts.
Mr. Holmes' work on "Federal Taxes" 'is one of the very few text boors
on Federal income tax. While entitled "Federal Taxes," the book is r-m ed
generally to income tax, other Federal taxes being referred to or discussed only
in so far as they relate to the determination of net income, or bear on questios
pertaining to the computation of income tax.
The latest edition of Mr. Holmes' book contains the principal
relating to income tax of the various revenue acts from 1913 to 1924 induliMl
together with the more important provision of the i9og Act imposing an excise
tax on corporations. It embodies not only references to the principal decisions
of the courts pertaining to questions arising in connection with the impozitin
of taxes, but to all of the decisions of any importance appearing in the Weekly
Treasury Bulletins up to Bulletin No. 49 of i924. These latter decisis include
Solicitor's opinions, Treasury Decisions, Rulings of the Inomne Tax Unit,
amendments to Articles of Regulations, etc.
The author in a clear, concise manner sets forth the law as it has been
applied by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the light of the regulations
promulgated by the Commissioner and in the light of court and departmental
decisions interpreting the various revenue acts. Examples are given throughout
in order to illustrate various points, and the latest act is frequently compared
with prior laws to show clearly the changes which have been made therein.
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The work appears to be particularly well indexed, which is an important
feature of any text book, especially to the legal practitioner, for although a
much needed proposition of law with the citation of cases in support of it is
contained within the covers of a text book, it is of no use if it cannot readily
be found.
Mr. Holmes' latest edition on Federal Taxes presents a thorough and
exhaustive study on the part of the author, and will prove a valuable addition to
any up-to-date law library.
J. R. Lam orelle.
Philadelphia.
SUPERSTITION OR RATIONALITY IN ACTION FOR PEACE? By A. V. Lundstedt,
Professor of Civil and Roman Law at the Royal University of Uppsala.
London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1925, pp. 235.
This book, the author states in the preface, is intended as an attack on
current theories of jurisprudence. It is primarily an attack on recent efforts to
promote the gro*th of order and law in international relations, but as a founda-
tion for his views as to international law the author discusses also the funda-
mental bases of municipal law.
The author's conception of law is that of rules of conduct which are actually
enforced by physical force applied by the community or state. These rules have
nothing to do with justice or a common sense of duty to society which are, in
the author's view, only the effect of the enforcement of the law through a long
period of time. The justification for a criminal law is that it is absolutely
necessary for the existence of organized society. The conduct denominated
criminal would be destructive of society if practised by the greater number of
individuals; it would be so practised were it not for the enforcement of the
criminal law by punishment and the criminal law is therefore necessary for the
community. The essence of law is force: the sole reason people do not commit
crimes is that those who do commit them are punished. The basis of the par-
ticular rules so enforced is the "public welfare," but how we are to ascertain
whether any particular rule actually does contribute to the public welfare he
does not tell us, and the belief that it does so, according to his theory, is simply
a result of its imposition by force. In the instances he discusses he says that
it is "self-evident" that these rules are for the public benefit.
Holding these views as to the nature of law, the author denies there is any
such thing as international law, because there is "Ao Law of Nations in the
sense of rules enforced consistently and without bias by an external power."
The existence of rules universally recognized as having the force of law does
not mean a true international law for Professor Lundstedt; common consent
cannot be a source of law according to him. Law is only something that is
"enforced irresistibly and consistently"; it can only be obtained in the inter-
national field "by an International Court of Justice equipped with irresistible
power and absolute authority But this in its turn demands the estab-
lishment of a world-parliament. This again would mean that the nations of
the civilized world would submit to a superior power-that is to say, that they
would really be combined in a state-system."
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Professor Lunstedt will not recognize any international law that does not
appear with all the trappings and accessories of the most developed municipal
system. Athena must spring fully armed from the head of Zeus. Needless to
say, this does not happen in the realm of fact as distinguished from mythology.
There is much that is timely in Lundstedt's criticism of jurisprudential theories.
It is well to emphasize the fundamental function of a criminal lkw in the face
of the prevailing tendency to focus attention too exclusively on the individual
crime and criminal; it is well to call attention to the reciprocal effect of the
law itself on the social consciousness, but in so doing to ignore completely the
growth or develpment or evolution-whichever term one may prefer to use-
both of legal rules and of social needs and conditions is to construct another
abstract theoretical system as arbitrary and as divorced from real life as some
of the theories of jurisprudence which Professor Lundstedt so caustically
criticizes.
Edward Lindsey.
Warren, Pa.
CASES ON THE LAV op TRusTs. By George P. Costigai, Jr., Professor of Law
in the University of California. American Casebook Series. St Paul,
Minn., West Publishing Co., 1925, pp. IO7.
Professor Costigan by this volume has added to the already considerable
list of case books which he has supplied for the use of the law-teaching profes-
sion. Of these the reviewer has taught from those on Wills and Contracts, and
it is therefore with particular relish that this book on Trusts is received.
Trusts is a field in which comparatively few case books have appeared,
although one at least of those which have appeared has been a landmark to
legal scholars and to its influence Mr. Costigan renders graceful acknowledgment
in his introduction.
The arrangement in this book is, in the main, familiar, although the author
introduces certain new classifications which should prove very helpful, as for
instance, in distinguishing trusts from partnerships, Mr. Costigan treats briefly
of the so-called "Massachusetts Trust" under which form many businesses are
carried on in some parts of the country.
A separate section is used to differentiate between trusts and specifically
unenforcible contracts, where the courts in handling the relations of the parties
to an agreement for sale of land, so often use language pertinent to trusts and
in some aspects, notably with regard to the proceeds of insurance policies,
actually treat the situation as a trust relationship, although one doubts whether
a vendor, who made a "secret profit" by buying in the agreement of sale, would
be held to account.
Of peculiar interest to Pennsylvanians is the use in the section distinguishing
trusts from debts of the case of Adams v. Kuehn, wherein the court attempts to
summarize the peculiar attitude of our courts which, having failed to follow
Lawrence v. Fox and thus permit a creditor beneficiary to sue upon a contract
to which he is not a party, have distinctly stretched, in some situations, the law
of trusts, as did the English courts at one time for like reasons to make such a
person cestui que trust.
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The author states that less than one-third of the cases have appeared in
prior works, and one agrees with him when he feels that these important cases
could not have been omitted. Many of the new cases have been very recently
decided and cover a wide range of jurisdictions.
The foot-notes, as has been the case with other books on this subject, are
peculiarly full, as in fact it appears to be the present tendency in most case
books, and the references to law review articles and notes are extremely com-
prehensive and, of course, more valuable to the average student than a mere
reference to cases.
The reviewer had hoped to find in a new case book a fuller treatment of
the various taxation aspects of trusts, which are nowadays so important There
is much to be said, naturally, for the view that these matters have little to do
with the theory of trusts, yet unquestionably they are often and increasingly the
motive for the creation of trusts and hence of practical importance to the
practicing attorney in advising his clients.
While the proof of a case book is in the teaching, one who teaches from
the author's case books on Wills and on Contracts feels that this is an eminently
teachable work which is as great a contribution to this field as those works are
to their
W. Foster Reeve, III.UniversityV of Pennsylvania.
